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Abstract
This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political par-
ties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved
in their nomination and their mandate expires on a ﬁxed date. This possibility arises
when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds oﬃce until
an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by a
weighted lottery. We show that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem
and implementing the socially optimal solution.
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This paper refers to a problem that appears when diﬀerent parties have to agree on
t h ec h o i c eo fac a n d i d a t ef o raﬁx e dt i m ep e r i o d . T h ec o n ﬂict arises when the period
expires and there is no agreement on a new appointee. This is a typical case of conﬂicting
norms that can be found in very diﬀerent environments. A case in point is that in which
political parties have to agree on the nomination of High-Court judges, as it happens with
the Constitutional Court in Spain, that is our key reference. On the one hand, we ﬁnd
that each judge is designated for a ﬁxed term. On the other hand, the rule establishes that
substituting a judge whose mandate expires requires a qualiﬁed majority in Parliament
(e.g. the candidate needs the support of 2/3 of the members). Both principles are sensible:
a ﬁxed time period prevents a disproportionate inﬂuence of speciﬁc individuals, and a wide
agreement in Parliament diminishes the eﬀects of the political cycle on the interpretation
of the fundamental norms.
Needless to say, there are cases in which the term of a judge expires and the Parliament
does not reach the required majority to approve a substitute. What happens then? The
default is, in many cases, that the status quo prevails. That is, the judge whose mandate
has expired can stay in oﬃce for some extra period (sometimes for years!). We have
seen that in the Spanish Constitutional Court, that has made very important decisions
with half of its members who should have been replaced well in advance. This is always a
source of concern about the nature of the resolutions adopted in that interim period (some
lawyers and politicians have actually questioned the legitimacy of those resolutions).
T h eu l t i m a t es o u r c eo ft h ec o n ﬂict is the design of the mechanism used to appoint
those judges. More speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of the default option on the incentives to reach
an agreement among the political parties. The reason is clear: if the ideology of the judge
to be substituted is close to a given party, then this party has no incentive to agree on a
diﬀerent candidate, unless it belongs to the same ideological group. When this party is
needed for the nomination, it will block the process.
Note that the problem cannot be solved by either imposing an external agreement
to the Parliament (the ultimate depositary of people’s authority) or disregarding the
necessary substitution of High Court Judges. So what?
We propose here a simple mechanism that is respectful with the Parliament and never-








 It can be described as follows. Once the judge’s appointment expires, the Parliament is
required to make a proposal that satisﬁes the established quota. If there is an agreement,
then the candidate is chosen and substitutes the exiting judge. This part coincides with
the standard procedure. If there is no agreement, though, then a weighted lottery applies.
Each party presents a candidate and such a candidate enters into a random choice mech-
anism with a probability weight equal to the share in the Parliament of the proposing
party. The weighted lottery is played and the chosen candidate will correspond to that
determined by the lottery. This is the new default option that would substitute that
of keeping the status quo and ensuring that no undue extension of mandates happens,
because a party can block the required agreement.
This new mechanism is fair because it is respectful with the distribution of power
among the parties. First, because it coincides with the existing one as long as parties are
able to reach an agreement. Second, because, on average, each party will get her preferred
candidate a fraction of time equal to the fraction of seats in the Parliament.
Solving the problem of those conﬂicting principles raises some interesting questions.
First, how often will parties agree on substituting a judge whose mandate has expired when
t h es t a t u sq u oi st h ed e f a u l to p t i o n ?O r ,p u td i ﬀerently, the problem described above is
just a rarity or we should expect to ﬁnd it frequently? Second, will the introduction of
the weighted lottery mechanism, as the new default option, induce the agreement in the
ﬁrst round? And third, will the outcome of this process be socially optimal?
We show in this paper that, under rather general conditions (single peaked preferences
on the ideological traits of the candidates) and a rich variety of candidates over the
ideological spectrum, the following holds:
(i) When status quo is the default option, disagreement is the natural outcome;
(ii) The weighted lottery mechanism induces the agreement between parties before
actually recurring to the lottery;
(iii) This new mechanism implements the social optimum as a Nash equilibrium; and
(iv) Those results are robust to the case of bi-dimensional preferences (i.e. when
parties care both about the ideology and the ability of the candidates).
This note builds on the non-cooperative theory of bargaining (following the semi-
nal work by Rubinstein, (1982)). More precisely, it is related to models of legislative








 (see Baron and Ferejohn (1989) for a classic reference). Despite being very simple, the
model has clear connections with two strands of the literature. First, in this paper the
status-quo plays a key role. In this sense, there are papers that have studied legislative
bargaining where, contrary to what happens in Rubinsteininan models, the status-quo
need not be a bad outcome for all participants. Banks and Duggan (2006) provide a
general multidimensional model of legislative bargaining where the status-quo can be any
arbitrary point in the policy space and show that this can lead to equilibrium delays in
the agreement (contrary to what happens in Rubinstein-type models). Secondly, there is
another strand of the literature that studies the implications of imposing super-majority
agreement requirements in negotiations (see the recent work by Cardona and Ponsatí
(2011) for a general characterization of equilibria in one-dimensional bargaining models
with super-majority rules).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section sets up the model and
predicts the outcome of the negotiations in the absence of any mechanism. Section 3
presents the weighted lottery mechanism and characterizes its implications. Section 4
brieﬂy elaborates on the consequences of taking into account not only the judges’ ideology,
but also their competence. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
Let us consider, for the sake of simplicity in exposition, the case in which the Parliament
consists of just two parties,  and  The Parliament has to design a new High-Court
judge, to substitute one whose term is over, by a qualiﬁed majority  (two thirds of its
members, say). Assume that none of the parties has enough seats in Parliament so as
to reach the qualiﬁed majority required. Therefore both parties have to agree on the
nomination. We can attach a power index to each party, given by the share of deputies in
the parliament, equal to  and   respectively, with + =1 ∈ (05 1].
The chosen candidate () has to be selected from a pool of candidates  in the ideo-
logical space [01] Assume, for the time being, that all candidates are equally capable of
serving as judges (there is no quality dimension in the problem).
The current incumbent has ideology 0 ∈  and this individual will retain his position








 Each party has an ideological position deﬁned by a function  () that represents
the value it assigns to selecting a judge of ideology  We assume that preferences are
single-peaked so that  =a r g m a x   () is the preferred candidate of party  = .
Moreover, we assume that the preferences are smooth and, hence, that  00
 () ≤ 0 for all
 Let    without loss of generality (that is, the closer  is to zero, the more leftist
is the chosen candidate).
The optimal choice, from a social perspective, corresponds to selecting the candidate
who better reﬂects the ideological composition of the parliament. In other words, the
optimal candidate would be:
 ≡  + 
2.1. Bilateral Negotiation
Assume that parties enter into a non-cooperative bargaining process in order to select
a candidate. The process can go on for inﬁnite-many periods with the status quo 0
prevailing as the default option until a choice is made.
In this setting it is easy to show that indeﬁnite disagreement is the most likely outcome,
no matter the negotiation protocol. Formally:
Proposition 1. If 0 ∈ ( ) no agreement is reached and the status-quo 0 prevails.
Proof. To prove the result it suﬃces to consider that, independently from the details
of the negotiation protocol, each party will always play the "safe" strategy of rejecting any
oﬀer they receive and making no oﬀer. This strategy ensures that parties obtain (0)
 (0) respectively.
Consider, without loss of generality, a proposal ˆ  made by party  If party  found
it optimal to make the oﬀer it is because  (0)   (ˆ ) Moreover, since 0   then
it necessarily follows that ˆ  0 Now, from the perspective of party  if the rejection-
strategy is not optimal for this oﬀer it is because  (0)  (ˆ ) and this, together with
0   requires ˆ  0 what results in a contradiction.
T h es a m ea r g u m e n ta p p l i e si fi ti sp a r t y the one that makes a proposal.
This simple result shows that, unless the status-quo is too extremist for both parties,
negotiations will certainly fail. The reason is that, when the status-quo is moderate,








 any possibility of agreement. Only when the status-quo is too extremist for both parties
there is room for mutual beneﬁt. That is, a necessary (yet not suﬃcient) condition for
a g r e e m e n ti st h a te i t h e r0   or 0   That situation can only occur if the party that
is closest to 0 has changed ideology moving towards a more central part of the political
spectrum. Otherwise a candidate 0 would never had been chosen.
Therefore, when parties ideologies are stable, non-cooperation is the sure outcome.
Consequently, the time period for which the judge has been nominated can last forever
as no solution to substitute the judge whose term has expired will be found.
3. Negotiations with Deadline and a Weighted Lottery
We have seen that, taking the status quo as the default option, negotiations are most
likely to fail. There is good evidence about that. Let us deﬁne a diﬀerent choice rule, by
changing the default option, that ensures that a new appointment will be obtained in due
course. We shall present ﬁrst this rule and then analyze how this new default aﬀects the
possibility of reaching an agreement.
Consider the following two-stage rule:
1. Stage 1: Parties open a process of bilateral negotiation in order to reach an agree-
ment within a given time span. If an agreement is obtained, then the chosen candi-
date is designated. If there is no agreement within the established period, we go to
stage 2.
2. Stage 2: The two parties are asked to simultaneously name their ﬁnal candidates 

 







 with prob. 


 with prob. 

Let us see how agents behave with this mechanism.
Consider the ﬁnal round and calculate the right value of 

 .E a c hp a r t yw i l lc h o o s e




















 with  =    =   It is immediate to check that equation [1] yields 

 =  That
is, each party will propose its preferred candidate as a dominant strategy and there is no
scope for manipulating the selection of candidates.
Now the question is: is there room for an agreement?
Let 

 be the expected beneﬁtt h a te a c hp a r t yo b t a i n sf r o mt h eﬁnal round (the
expected utility of the lottery). Formally


 =  ()+( 1− ) ()
Now let ˜  be the certainty equivalent to this expected beneﬁt. In other words, ˜  is the
point in the ideological spectrum at maximum distance of party ’s ideal point, compatible
with reaching an agreement in the ﬁrst stage. Formally.
˜  =m a x
 




˜  =m i n
 
s.t.  () ≥ 


The following result is obtained:
Proposition 2. Assume that preferences () for  =  are single peaked and
smooth, with  00() ≤ 0 Then, the weighted-lottery mechanism ensures that there is
scope for an agreement between the two parties in the ﬁrst stage. Moreover, the socially
optimal solution  is always in the set of mutually acceptable candidates.
Proof. First, notice that a necessary condition for the weighted-lottery mechanism to
induce an agreement in the ﬁrst stage is that ˜  ≥ ˜  Otherwise, there is no agreement
and the ﬁnal round is reached.
Let us show now that ˜  ≤  ≤ ˜  which trivially implies the condition above. Take
ﬁrst party  From the deﬁnition of ˜  we have that ˜  ≥  if and only if
 () ≥ 

 ⇐⇒








 and this inequality holds due to the fact that  00
 () ≤ 0 The same logic applies for the
case of party 
Proposition 1 says that, independently on the negotiation protocol, the weighted
lottery mechanism induces the parties to agree on an intermediate ideological level,
0 ∈ [˜ ˜ ] without actually recurring to the lottery. The reason is that there is al-
ways scope for mutual beneﬁt beyond the thresholds deﬁned by the certainty equivalent
values. Note that this result does not require any particular functional form and holds
for any single peaked utility function.
The second part of Proposition 1 can be rephrased as follows:
Corollary 1. The socially optimal solution can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium
by the weighted-lottery mechanism.
Remark 1. The case of three parties,    where  stands for "centrist", is rather
i m m e d i a t ea sw e l l .W h e na n yt w op a r t i e ss u ﬃce to reach the established quota, the solu-
tion corresponds to the centrist candidate in the ﬁrst round (which may be incompatible
with the social optimum). In this context the third party is pivotal and gets all the sur-
plus. Otherwise the third party is irrelevant, gets nothing, and we go back to the two
party case.
4. The choice problem when both ideology and ability matter
Consider now the more general case in which the parties’ preferences are bi-dimensional:
they care both about the ideology () and the ability () of the candidates. Utilities,
therefore, take the form () for  ∈ {}. We assume, as before, that utilities are





  0) if and only if   (resp.  ), and
2()
  0. Concerning
the ability dimension we assume that utilities are increasing,
()
  0 and that both
parties agree on the measurement of ability, that varies in a compact interval []
The following result is quite straightforward,
Proposition 3. Assume that () is single-peaked and concave in  and increasing
in  for  =  Then, the weighted-lottery mechanism induces an agreement on some








 Proof. Let () denote the highest ability attainable for a candidate with ideology
As
()
  0 for both parties, then a change from any  6= () to () would imply
an increase in the value obtained by both parties. Therefore,  6= () can never be an
equilibrium.
Deﬁne now ˜  () ≡  (()) for each  ∈ [01] Then Proposition 1 brings the
desired result.
An example of a situation where the weighted lottery mechanism works well is when
there is always a high-competent candidate for every ideology level. Formally, this corre-
sponds to a situation where, for every  it holds that ()=
Note that the social optimum, [()] can also be implemented as a Nash equilib-
rium.
5. Final comments
We have presented a very simple model that suggests a way of solving a serious problem
in the application of conﬂicting principles. We have shown that when political parties
have to agree on the substitution of a High-Court judge, designated for a ﬁxed term, the
default option aﬀects substantially the incentives to reach an agreement. When holding
oﬃce until the agreement is reached is the default, then no agreement should be expected.
When the default is a weighted lottery, then agreement will most likely occur, prior to
the realization of the lottery.
O n em a ya r g u et h a tt h i si sa na r t i ﬁcial mechanism that goes against the culture of
lawyers and politicians. This is not the case. A lottery mechanism, known as insaculation,
was used for almost four centuries in Spain to appoint public oﬃcers at diﬀerent levels.
This choice procedure was introduced in the XIV Century in order to avoid the excessive
inﬂuence of some families in the management of public aﬀairs. A set of candidates was ﬁrst
selected and then pieces of paper with their names were introduced in a bag (sacculum,
i nL a t i n )f r o mw h i c ho n ew a sc h o s e na tr a n d o m .O u rp r o p o s a lh e r em a yb er e g a r d i n ga s
following this tradition.
We have kept the model at the simplest level in order to illustrate the key message.
There are two questions worth commenting that involve a more complex setting. The ﬁrst









In our two-stage model no time discount has been contemplated. This is so because
we implicitly assume that the period to reach an agreement is short. When the period
enabled to reach an agreement is long enough and the status quo prevails meanwhile, the
results may change. More speciﬁcally, impatience may aﬀect the strategies of the parties
and there will be a threshold beyond which it could be preferable waiting until the lottery
applies.1
We have assumed that there are enough eligible judges to cover all the political spec-
trum. When this is not the case, the results may also change. Things would not change
much provided there is enough variety that spreads more or less uniformly over the polit-
ical spectrum. Otherwise results will depend on the richness and the speciﬁc distribution
of the candidates. Be as it may, the case of discrete alternatives always makes more
diﬃcult the model and opens the problem of multiplicity of equilibria.2
1See Porteiro (2007) for an analysis of a negotiation protocol that explicitly accounts for discounting
in the presence of a status-quo and where the level of patience has direct implications on the equilibrium
negotiation strategies of players.
2From a technical perspective, moving from a bargaining problem over a perfectly divisible issue to
one where there are indivisibilities, is far from straightforward. As the paper by Van Damme, Selten and
Winter (1990) shows, introducing indivisibilities in the alternating-oﬀer bargaining game of Rubinstein
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